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ABSTRACT. River basin management is faced with complex problems that are characterized by uncertainty
and change. In transboundary river basins, historical, legal, and cultural differences add to the complexity.
The literature on adaptive management gives several suggestions for handling this complexity. It recognizes
the importance of management regimes as enabling or limiting adaptive management, but there is no
comprehensive overview of regime features that support adaptive management. This paper presents such
an overview, focused on transboundary river basin management. It inventories the features that have been
claimed to be central to effective transboundary river basin management and refines them using adaptive
management literature. It then collates these features into a framework describing actor networks, policy
processes, information management, and legal and financial aspects. Subsequently, this framework is
applied to the Orange and Rhine basins. The paper concludes that the framework provides a consistent and
comprehensive perspective on transboundary river basin management regimes, and can be used for assessing
their capacity to support adaptive management.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past, river basin management was often the
exclusive realm of hydraulic engineers, who
managed the river for a single purpose only, such
as navigation or hydropower. Nowadays, river basin
management is often multi-purpose and basin-wide,
and involves many more actors (cf. Ridder et al.
2005). Moreover, river basin management has to
deal with increasing rates of human-induced change
and increasing concerns about the causes and
consequences of these changes (Toffler 1980, Pahl-
Wostl 2004). In transboundary river basins,
differences in legal frameworks, historical and
cultural backgrounds, and technical capabilities add
to the complexity (Timmerman and Langaas 2005).
Adaptive management has been proposed as a way
of dealing with uncertainty and change (Holling
1978). It aims at developing robust and flexible
management strategies that perform well under
different possible futures and can be modified if
necessary. It acknowledges that current knowledge
will never be sufficient for future management
(Pagan and Crase 2004). Therefore, policies are
treated as hypotheses and their implementation as
experiments to test them (Walters and Holling 1990,
Gunderson 1999). Adaptive management requires
a process of active learning by all stakeholders, and
continuous improvement of management strategies
by learning from the outcomes of implemented
policies (Geldof 1995, Pahl-Wostl 2004, 2007). The
learning process is not a matter of random trial and
error, but a structured, cyclical process, involving
1) integrated assessment of current problems and
possible solutions as perceived by different
stakeholders, 2) setting goals, 3) formulation of
policies that are hypothesized to contribute to
reaching the goals, 4) implementation, to test the
hypotheses, through 5) systematic monitoring and
evaluation of policy outcomes, including surprises
(Fig. 1). In practice, these are not distinct stages, as
the system pulses through alternating spurts of
learning and implementing.
By involving all relevant stakeholders in the
assessment and goal-setting stages, an overview of
relevant technical knowledge, values, and interests
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Fig. 1. The adaptive management cycle (Pahl-Wostl 2007).
can be obtained. Such an overview allows for
designing “experiments” that minimize the risk of
degradation of the ecosystem, in particular
irreversible change, and failure of ecosystem
services. Furthermore, joint policy formulation,
implementation, and evaluation may improve
learning and increase support for policy changes.
One strategy to avoid unnecessary risks is to use
simulation models to develop system knowledge
and inform the debate (Lee 1999).
Despite its popularity, adaptive management is not
without its problems. First, the meaning of adaptive
management is not fixed. Within the literature, two
interpretations of adaptive management can be
distinguished: “scientific adaptive management,”
which focuses on experimentation as a means to
learn more about the social ecosystem, and
“adaptive co-management,” which emphasizes the
importance of stakeholder involvement (cf. McLain
and Lee 1996, Olsson et al. 2004). Secondly,
although the number of examples of adaptive
management is increasing (e.g., McLain and Lee
1996, Gilmour et al. 1999, Tompkins and Adger
2004), these examples often remain limited to small
scales and to modeling instead of experimentation
(Walters 1997, Lee 1999). One explanation given
for this in the adaptive management literature is that
current institutional settings are often too
constraining and inflexible to allow continuous
improvement (e.g., Walters 1997, Gunderson 1999,
Johnson 1999, Folke et al. 2005). Yet, this literature
does not provide us with a comprehensive overview
of institutional factors that support adaptive
management (cf. McLain and Lee 1996).
This paper sets out to provide such an overview in
the form of a framework for assessing the adaptive
capacity of transboundary river basin management
regimes. First, it identifies the features of
transboundary management regimes that are
mentioned in water management literature as central
to effective management. Second, it complements
and refines these features using adaptive
management literature and elaborating on it. These
features are subsequently collated into a framework
for assessing the adaptive capacity of transboundary
river basin management regimes. Finally, the paper
applies the framework to two selected regimes—the
management regimes of the Orange Basin in
Southern Africa and the Rhine Basin in Western
Europe—in order to test whether it can be used for
describing and assessing actual regimes. The paper
concludes with a discussion of the framework and
recommendations for further research.
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KEY FEATURES OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MANAGEMENT REGIMES
There are presently some 260 transboundary river
basins around the world, covering 45% of the land
surface of the earth (Wolf et al. 1999). Unilateral
action in these basins is often ineffective,
inefficient, or simply impossible, e.g., a dam on a
boundary stretch of a river. Moreover, it can harm
the other basin countries (UN ESCAP 2003). For
this reason, transboundary cooperation is necessary.
Transboundary cooperation is shaped by, and
contributes to, the development of transboundary
management regimes. According to Krasner (1983),
a transboundary regime consists of “implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of
international relations.” Consequently, river basin
management regimes are defined as the principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations in (transboundary)
river basin management converge.
In this paper, we focus on five central regime
elements: actor networks, water law, water policy,
information management, and financing systems
(Fig 2). Key elements are the—relatively stable but
not unchanging—actor networks. The actor
networks make the laws and policies, which in turn
influence their activities (cf. structuration theory;
Giddens 1984). Management regimes can be
distinguished from operational management: the
technical measures and the regulatory, financial,
and communicative instruments that directly
intervene in the physical river basin system, or
directly address the users of the river and the river
basin. Moreover, management regimes can be
distinguished from the general institutional and
political context and from regimes in other policy
fields (see Fig. 2). This section summarizes the main
features of transboundary river basin management
regimes that are mentioned in literature as being
central to effective management.
Actor Networks
Transboundary cooperation can be institutionalized
by the establishment of international river basin
commissions (Dieperink 1998). Ideally, they should
support an interdisciplinary and intersectoral
approach (Wolf 1998). International river basin
authorities with decision-making and enforcement
powers can be practical for performing specific
operational tasks, like restoration of water quality
or operation and management of infrastructure
(Mostert et al. 1999). Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and donors can play a
valuable role in transboundary river basin
management as well. Although this may take more
time initially, involvement of NGOs and the general
public can support cooperation and enlarge the
acceptance of proposed measures (Huisman et al.
2000).
Legal Framework
Transboundary river basin management can be
analyzed in terms of the development and
implementation of international “agreements,” such
as treaties, protocols, gentlemen’s agreements, tact
understandings, etc., including binding laws and
non-binding policies (Bernauer 2002, Mostert
2005). To conform to international law, agreements
should reflect the relevant principles of equitable
and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to
cause significant harm, and the duty to notify and
exchange information (Mostert et al. 1999). Another
important aspect is how the legal framework deals
with information exchange and communication
across different legal and institutional frameworks,
cultures, and languages (Gooch et al. 2006). Finally,
the likelihood and intensity of dispute decreases as
treaties, as well as water management bodies, have
the capacity to absorb rapid physical or institutional
change (Wolf et al. 2003).
Policy
Policy refers to the goals of government, or other
organizations, and the strategies to reach these
goals. Policies can be recorded in formal documents
or followed in practice. To promote effective
implementation, policies should be tailored toward
the specific interests and resources of the involved
parties (Marty 2001). In addition, policies should
be updated periodically to provide an opportunity
to adapt objectives and measures to changing
conditions and the opinions of society (Huisman et
al. 2000, Marty 2001).
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Fig. 2. River basin management regime and criteria for an adaptive regime.
Information Management
Information management is the iterative process of
determining information needs, and producing,
exchanging, and using information. Cooperation in
information management, e.g., joint monitoring, is
often an effective way to start developing trust
between riparian countries. Free access to
information is an essential precondition for this
(Mostert et al. 1999, van der Zaag and Savenije
2000). National governments and transboundary
commissions should exchange information and
actively disseminate information to the public
(Nilsson 2003). This can result in the development
of an improved technical capacity, more mutual
understanding, a shared vocabulary, and shared
insights (Mostert et al. 1999, van der Zaag and
Savenije 2000). To broaden the knowledge base and
prevent selective information use, institutional
mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that all
available information is used. These mechanisms
include requirements for public participation, and
offering possibilities for counter expertise
(Timmerman 2004).
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Financing
Without a good financing system, transboundary
river basin management is not viable in the long run.
The costs of transboundary river basin management
include the costs of producing a diverse set of public
goods (e.g., flood protection) and market goods (e.
g., hydropower), as well as the costs of the
management process itself (e.g., travel costs). In so-
called developing countries, international donors
and banks often bear the management costs of
negotiating an international treaty, but they may also
finance river basin commissions and research
projects for a longer time, and give loans for specific
projects. The effectiveness of donor and bank
involvement can be improved greatly when they
coordinate their activities better (Wolf 1998,
Mostert et al. 1999, Mostert 2005). However, too
much dependence on donors and banks makes
management vulnerable. Financial as well as
ecological sustainability can be improved by
recognizing water as an economic good and
recovering the costs as much as possible from the
users (Global Water Partnership (GWP) 2003).
Water pricing can reduce excessive water use, but
at the same time, access to clean water and sanitation
should be offered to all humans at an affordable
price (International Conference on Water and the
Environment (ICWE) 1992). The provision of
public goods and the management costs can be
financed from national taxes, such as general taxes
or a tax per hectare. Governments should have a
financing strategy to match income with costs
(GWP 2003).
Cooperation Process
In addition to regime features, literature on
transboundary river basin management also
contains many lessons for the international
cooperation process. Probably the most important
requirement for successful international cooperation
is mutual trust, which can only be developed in small
steps (Mostert et al. 1999, Huisman et al. 2000).
Political cooperation can more easily be established
when technical cooperation is already in place. To
convince upstream parties of the need for
cooperation, downstream parties often have to be
alert and creative (Dieperink 1998, van der Zaag
and Savenije 2000). It is also important to identify
and solve conflicts before they escalate (Wolf
1998). Water management disputes can often only
be solved through active dialog among the
disciplines that are relevant for the issue at stake,
and by involving policy sectors other than water, as
this can open up new opportunities for win–win
situations, e.g., through issue linking (Mostert et al.
1999, Huisman et al. 2000, van der Zaag and
Savenije 2000). Other mechanisms that can be used
for overcoming conflicting interests include
financial compensation, and accepting less
favorable agreements in the expectation that other
countries will do the same (“diffuse reciprocity”)
(LeMarquand 1977, Mostert et al. 1999).
ADAPTIVE RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
REGIMES
The literature on transboundary river basin
management does not provide a satisfactory
overview of institutional features that support
adaptive management. Many articles are based on
one or a few cases only, different theoretical
approaches are used, e.g., institutional economics,
politics, geography, and engineering, and, most
importantly, the issue of uncertainty and change is
addressed to a limited extent only. However, using
the adaptive management literature, it is possible to
complement and refine the insights gained, and
develop a complete framework for assessing the
extent to which transboundary river basin
management regimes support adaptive management.
The framework consists of a number of criteria for
the different regime elements, and indicators for
each criterion (Table 1). Although some of the
criteria and indicators have been derived directly
from the literature, others had to be developed by
the authors themselves. The framework focuses on
the international level, but it can also be applied at
the national and sub-national levels, where many
crucial decisions for transboundary management
are made.
Actor Networks
A central requirement of adaptive management is
active learning by all relevant stakeholders (Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004, Folke et al. 2005).
Transboundary water management often centers
around national governments, taken as unitary
actors, but in addition, cooperation is needed
between different government sectors and
government levels, between government authorities,
NGOs, and individual citizens, and between all
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Table 1. Framework for adaptive management regimes (Raadgever and Mostert 2005)
CRITERIA INDICATORS
A. Actor networks
1. Cross-sectoral co-operation  
l
 Sectoral governments actively involve other government sectors
 
l
 Cooperation structures include government bodies from different sectors; many
contacts generally
 
l
 Conflicts are dealt with constructively, resulting in inclusive agreements to which
the parties are committed
2. Cooperation between
administrative levels
 
l
 Lower-level governments are involved in decision making by higher-level
governments
 
l
 Cooperation structures include government bodies from different hierarchical
levels; many contacts generally
 
l
 Conflicts are dealt with constructively, resulting in inclusive agreements to which
the parties are committed
3. Cooperation across
administrative boundaries
 
l
 Downstream governments are involved in decision making by upstream
governments
 
l
 International/ transboundary cooperation structures exist (e.g., river basin
commissions); many contacts generally
 
l
 Conflicts are dealt with constructively, resulting in inclusive agreements to which
the parties are committed
4. Broad stakeholder
participation
 
l
 Legal provisions concerning access to information, participation in decision
making (e.g., consultation requirements) and access to courts
 
l
 Cooperation structures include non-governmental stakeholders
 
l
 Non-governmental stakeholders actually contribute to agenda setting, analyzing
problems, developing solutions, and taking decisions (“co-production”)
 
l
 Non-governmental stakeholders undertake parts of river basin management
themselves, e.g., through water users’ associations
 
l
 Governments take stakeholder input seriously
(con'd)
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B. Legal framework
5. Appropriate legal
framework
 
l
 A complete and clear legal framework for water management exists (with
sufficient detail)
 
l
 Policies have to be reviewed and changed periodically
6. Adaptable legislation  
l
 Laws and regulations can easily be changed
 
l
 Water (use) rights can easily be changed / are not permanent
C. Policy 
7. Long time horizon  
l
 Solutions for short-term problems do not cause more problems in the (far) future
(20 years or more)
 
l
 Preparations are already being made for the (far) future (20 years or more)
8. Flexible measures, keeping
options open
 
l
 Measures taken now or proposed for the near future do not limit the range of
possible measures that can be taken in the far future and are preferably reversible
9. Experimentation  
l
 Small-scale policy experiments take place / are financially supported
10. Full consideration of
possible measures
 
l
 Several alternatives and scenarios are discussed
 
l
 Alternatives include small- and large-scale and structural and non-structural
measures
11. Actual implementation of
policies
 
l
 Plans and policies are actually implemented
 
l
 Policies are not dogmatically stuck to when there are good reasons not to
implement them, e.g., new and unforeseen circumstances and new insights
D. Information management
12. Joint or participative
information production
 
l
 Different government bodies are involved in setting the terms of reference and
supervising the search, or are at least consulted (interviews, surveys etc.)
 
l
 The same for non-governmental stakeholders
13. Interdisciplinarity  
l
 Different disciplines are involved in defining and executing the research: in
addition to technical and engineering sciences, also, e.g., ecology and the social
sciences
(con'd)
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14. Elicitation of mental
models / critical self-reflection
about assumptions
 
l
 Researchers allow their research to be challenged by stakeholders and present their
own assumptions in as far as they are aware of them
 
l
 Research results are not presented in an authoritative way, but in a facilitative way,
to stimulate reflection by stakeholders about what is possible and what it is they
want
15. Explicit consideration of
uncertainty
 
l
 Uncertainties are not glossed over, but communicated (in final reports, orally)
16. Broad communication  
l
 Governments exchange information and data with other governments
 
l
 Governments actively disseminate information and data to the public: on the
internet, and also by producing leaflets, through the media, etc.
17. Use of information  
l
 New information is used in public debates (and is not distorted)
 
l
 New information influences policy
As to the issues for which information should be produced, communicated, and used, see under C.
E. Financing
18. Appropriate financing
system
 
l
 Sufficient (public and private) resources are available
 
l
 Costs are recovered from the users by public and private financial instruments
(charges, prices, insurance, etc.)
 
l
 Decision making and financing under the same control
 
l
 Authorities can take loans and depreciate their assets to facilitate efficient use of
resources and replacement of assets
these and the experts. All these actors have different
resources that are necessary for transboundary river
basin management, such as information, expertise,
funds, and legal competencies. To improve the
legitimacy and efficacy of management, the views
of all relevant stakeholders should be taken into
account. This requires, first, that authorities,
experts, and stakeholders realize that they depend
on each other for reaching their own goals. Next,
they need to start interacting, share their problem
perceptions, and develop different potential
solutions. This requires development of mutual
trust, recognition of diversity, and critical self-
reflection. Finally, the stakeholders need to make
joint decisions and make arrangements for
implementation (Gray 1989, Ridder et al. 2005).
Legal Framework
The adaptive management literature does not
contain many specifics concerning the legal
framework. Reasoning from the logic of adaptive
management, however, we hypothesize that water
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law should be complete and clear, enabling all
stakeholders to express their concerns and provide
input into management, and providing all legal tools
for regulating the use of the environment, while still
allowing sufficient freedom to experiment with new
approaches. Developing such a framework is a
difficult balancing act requiring a lot of skill and
creativity. A complete legal framework should
include arrangements for public participation,
information management, financing, and planning,
as well as many provisions concerning operational
management, such as permitting (cf. GWP 2003).
It should also contain provisions to regularly review
and, if necessary, adapt policies. The framework
itself should be adaptable as well. The legislative
process should not be too time consuming and
complex, and individual water rights should not be
permanent, but subject to review, in order to adapt
to changing circumstances and new insights.
Policy
As mentioned in the introduction, adaptive
management acknowledges the uncertainty inherent
in policy making, and therefore, advocates
developing robust and flexible policies. This
requires that the full range of possible measures is
considered, and that these measures are assessed in
different scenarios, such as “weak” or “strong”
climate change and “weak” or “strong” economic
growth (e.g., van der Heijden 1996, Carpenter and
Gunderson 2001). Moreover, policies should keep
as many options open as possible, and be flexible
to change when new evidence comes up (e.g.,
Carpenter and Gunderson 2001). The reason for this
is, first, it may be impossible to identify measures
that perform well under all scenarios. Second, it is
impossible to anticipate all eventualities: future
developments may lie outside the scope of the
scenarios considered. And third, even in the current
situation, our knowledge of ecological and social
systems is insufficient for predicting the effects of
measures with complete certainty. For this reason,
small-scale policy experiments could be conducted
(cf. Gunderson et al. 1995). Generally, a long time
horizon should be applied, and last but not least,
policies should be implemented. This usually
requires that the stakeholders responsible for, or
influencing, the implementation of policies already
participate in policy development (see the paragraph
on Actor Networks, above).
Information Management
As active learning by all relevant stakeholders is
central to adaptive management, information
management should actively involve all important
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.
Stakeholders should have the opportunity to express
their information needs, direct information
production, and exchange and discuss data and
viewpoints to develop a shared knowledge base and
mutual understanding of the system to be managed
and the problems that occur (cf. Timmerman and
Langaas 2005). The shared knowledge base should
integrate technical, political, and process
knowledge in order to facilitate informed decision
making and avoid unnecessary risks. Moreover, the
shared knowledge base should reflect the
perceptions of all stakeholders in order to promote
the legitimacy and quality of the knowledge. This
requires that stakeholder perceptions, or “mental
models,” including those of the experts, are first
elicited and then discussed. Experts should not
impose their, often mono-disciplinary, view on the
issues at stake, but reflect critically on their own
assumptions, and be open to the expertise of other
disciplines and the local population. Experts should
also communicate uncertainties, and not assume
that other stakeholders cannot cope with uncertainty
(Wynne 1996). Transparency about information
and its limitations decreases the risk of
misinterpretations and strategic information use
purely to legitimize policy, and maximizes the
chances of real learning (cf. Weiss 1977). As
implementation of policies often occurs at the local
level, and the effects are often felt at this level, there
is a need for effective information transfer between
the transboundary and the local level.
Financing
The challenges for the financing system of
transboundary river basin management are to ensure
sufficient funding, prevent perverse price
incentives, and maximize learning opportunities.
Moreover, the total costs should remain acceptable.
Although participatory approaches, experimentation,
and monitoring of the outcome costs money, in the
long run they may prevent costly delays and the
construction of unnecessary, expensive infrastructure
(cf. Beierle 1998, Carnes et al. 1998, Chess and
Purcell 1999, Charnley and Engelbert 2005).
Financing systems are most robust when they can
rely on multiple sources. As stated before, cost
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recovery, e.g., by means of water pricing, adds to
the robustness of the financing system by adding
private funds, and may reduce water use and
pollution. In addition, cost recovery may limit the
construction of infrastructure. Infrastructure is often
inflexible, as it cannot easily be adapted to changes,
e.g., in water demand. Ideally, decision making,
financing, and benefiting should be in one hand.
This promotes the integral assessment of measures
and the implementation of measures that have been
agreed upon, and minimizes the chance of overuse
because others have to pay the bill—literally or
metaphorically (cf. Huitema et al. 2008). That being
said, a perfect match usually is not possible, and
river basin management should not become too
complex. Finally, authorities should be able to take
loans and depreciate their assets. This makes it
easier to make long-term investments that would
otherwise have to be financed in one year, and
ensures that assets can be replaced in time.
ASSESSMENT OF THE ORANGE AND
RHINE REGIMES
The framework described in the previous section
has been applied to seven transboundary river basin
management regimes in Europe, Africa, and Asia
in order to test whether it can be used for describing
actual regimes and assessing their adaptive capacity
(Raadgever and Mostert 2005; see Fig. 3). For each
basin, one or more researchers with experience in
that basin first performed a literature study to
describe the regime according to a common format
(see the individual case study reports: Becker 2005,
Kranz et al. 2005a, 2005b, Raadgever 2005a, 2005b,
Timmerman 2005, Timmerman and Doze 2005). In
the Rhine and Orange basins, additional interviews
were conducted to capture less formalized
knowledge. Secondly, the researchers scored
“their” regimes for each criterion for adaptive
regimes (cf. Table 1), using a three-point scale: 1)
low, 2) average, or 3) high. Then, the scores for the
different basins were compared and discussed to
check whether all researchers had applied the
criteria in the same way. This resulted in some small
adjustments to the scores.
In this section, we present the results for two of the
seven basins: the Orange and Rhine (Table 2, Figs.
4 and 5). These basins have been selected because
of the high availability of information. Even so,
information on some of the criteria was limited,
especially on criteria 14 and 15. The assessment of
the two regimes revealed large differences between
the two basins. The Rhine regime scores higher on
the criteria for an adaptive regime than the Orange
regime. A summary of the results can be found in
Table 3 and more details can be found in the basin
reports (Kranz et al. 2005a, Raadgever 2005b).
Assessment of the Regime in the Orange Basin
The Orange basin regime scores average on the
criteria, with a lot of progress in recent years (Kranz
et al. 2005a). Transboundary cooperation is still in
an emerging state, as the Orange-Senqu River Basin
Commission (ORASECOM) was only established
in 2000. The development of transboundary
institutions has been driven by donors, who have
been involved in financing the establishment of the
ORASECOM, financing participatory processes,
and financing concrete research projects in the
basin. Donor funding may not be the ideal financial
source for adaptive management (see below), but it
did contribute to the development of cooperation
and more complete law. Integration of the water
sector with other sectors is still low. Although
government structures are traditionally top down,
there is increasing awareness that local levels should
be more intensively involved in international
planning processes. Improving public participation
has been identified as a major task of the
ORASECOM, and serious efforts have been
undertaken to fulfill this task, e.g., the development
of a roadmap for public participation. In addition,
provisions for stakeholder participation have been
established in new water laws and policies—most
prominently in South Africa— but implementation
is still limited. This may be explained by the lack
of adequate methods for communication with
relevant stakeholder groups, particularly in rural
areas.
International law in the basin consists primarily of
the Southern African Development Countries
Protocol on Shared Watercourses, the legal
framework around the ORASECOM, and several
bilateral agreements. These do not yet constitute a
comprehensive legal framework, but they are
adaptive to some extent. The legal framework
clearly refers to integrated water resources
management (IWRM) as the guiding principle for
water management. National water laws are
explicitly linked to international agreements. They
have undergone several adjustments and updates
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Fig. 3. Map of the seven studied river basins.
over recent years, and some have included
provisions for a periodical update.
Policy development in the Orange basin scores
average, but policy implementation scores low.
Water management in the basin has traditionally
concentrated on large-scale infrastructure, such as
dams and water transfer pipelines, tailored toward
meeting short-term water demands of individual
countries. Recently, there is a lot of discussion on
the long-term adverse effects of large-scale
infrastructure, and alternatives such as demand
management, stricter regulation, and benefit sharing
among riparian states have been advocated.
Implementation of transboundary policies is very
slow, but many stakeholders expect a lot from the
multilateral planning under the auspices of the
ORASECOM within the coming years.
The Orange basin scores average with respect to
shared production of information between the
riparian countries, but low with respect to
information exchange and utilization. Several
research institutes and universities are involved in
data collection on various issues of water
management. The need to develop, exchange, and
integrate data has been clearly identified, as a key
task of the ORASECOM. However, an integrated
data and information system has not been
established yet. The dissemination of information
by the ORASECOM to stakeholder groups is
limited.
The Orange basin scores low with respect to the
financing system. Financial contributions of
international donors have been quite instrumental
in the development of large infrastructural works,
which increased the availability of resources, but
also increased dependence on third parties.
Currently, donor efforts seem to be concentrating
more and more on institutional capacity building,
which is expected to support adaptive management
by contributing to cooperation, law, and policy. In
addition, the member states have been more and
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Table 2. Overview of main characteristics of the Orange and Rhine river basins
Basin Basin
Area
(103 k-
m2)
River Len-
gth (km)
Average discharge
at mouth (m3/s)
Countries Main river/
water users
Main issues
Orange 948 † 2200 95 ‡ South Africa
Namibia
Botswana
Lesotho
• Irrigation /
 agriculture
• Environmental
 demands
• Power generation
• Industry
• Domestic use
• Water availability /
 allocation
• (Interbasin) water
 transfers
• Droughts
Rhine 198 § 100 2200 Germany Neth-
erlands
Switzerland
France
Austria Luxem-
bourg
Belgium
Liechtenstein
Italy
• Navigation
• Irrigation /
 agriculture
• Industry
• Power generation
• Domestic use
• Waste water
 disposal
• Recreation
• Pollution / water quality
• Floods
• Ecological restoration
† Based on Wolf et al. (1999)
‡
 Interpretation of graph of discharge at downstream location (South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism. 1999. National State of the Environment Report). [online] URL: http://www.ngo.grida.no/soesa/nsoer/issues/water/
state2.htm#rivers)
§
 Based on Coördineringscomité Rijn. 2005. Internationaal stroomgebiedsdistrict Rijn - Kenmerken, beoordeling van de
milieueffecten van menselijke activiteiten en economische analyse van het watergebruik (Deel A = overkoepelend deel,
stand 18-03-05). [online] URL: http://www.kaderrichtlijnwater.nl/
more involved in the financing of the ORASECOM,
and have recently split the costs of the permanent
secretariat among the four of them.
Assessment of the Regime in the Rhine Basin
In the Rhine basin, long-lasting institutional
stability has created opportunities to develop trust
and cooperation, and thus this region is closest to
meeting the criteria (Raadgever 2005b). In the
International Commission for the Protection of the
Rhine (ICPR), the riparian countries have
cooperated for many decades. The ICPR consists of
a plenary commission, comprising national
representatives, permanent multidisciplinary working
groups, and a secretariat, supporting the plenary
commission and the working groups. Adjustment
of water policies with agricultural and spatial
planning policies takes place, to some extent, at the
national and sub-national levels. Lower-level
governments are often involved in the implementation
of (inter)national policy. Non-governmental
organizations, citizens, and the scientific
community are involved in many different ways in
water management, and a high degree of
organization and cooperation between various
actors has been established. Formal procedures for
participation in decision making and access to
information are well-established in all basin states.
The legal agreements developed in the framework
of the ICPR focus on institutional issues, and
chloride and chemical pollution (cf. Dieperink
1998). Several, non-legally binding, policy
documents, such as the Rhine Action Plan of 1987,
contain additional provisions concerning water
quality, ecology, and flooding. An influential legal
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Fig. 4. Map of the Orange basin (South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, retrieved 22
August 2007 from http://www.dwaf.gov.za/orange/images/rm017m6.gif).
Ecology and Society 13(1): 14
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art14/
Fig. 5. Map of the Rhine basin (UNEP/DEWA/GRID-Europe, Retrieved 22 August 2007 from http://ww
w.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/freshwater_europe/images/map4.jpg).
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Table 3. Qualitative scores of basins on criteria for adaptive management (- = low, 0 = average, + = high)
Criterion Orange Rhine
A. Actor networks (Average 1–4) 0 0 / +
1. Cross-sectoral cooperation - 0
2. Cooperation between administrative levels 0 0
3. Cooperation across administrative boundaries 0 +
4. Broad stakeholder participation 0 +
B. Legal framework (Average 5–6) - / 0 0 / +
5. Appropriate legal framework - +
6. Adaptable legislation 0 0
C. Policy (Average 7–11) 0 +
7. Long time horizon 0 +
8. Flexible measures, keeping options open 0 +
9. Experimentation 0 0
10. Full consideration of possible measures 0 +
11. Actual implementation of policies - +
D. Information management (Average 12–17) - / 0 0 / +
12. Joint / participative information production 0 +
13. Interdisciplinarity 0
14. Elicitation of mental models / critical self-reflection about assumptions
15. Explicit consideration of uncertainty 0 0
16. Broad communication +
17. Use of information - 0
E. Financing (18) - +
18. Appropriate financing system - +
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document is the EU Water Framework Directive
(2000/60/EC), which includes many requirements
for river water quality, ecology, and the water
management process. The international law and
policy are elaborated in comprehensive systems of
national and lower-level law. In most Rhine
countries, adaptation of water law, regulations, and
policy are possible, and in some cases, periodic
review is obligatory.
The ICPR policies contain a wide range of small-
and large-scale, structural and non-structural
measures, and usually have a long time horizon. The
planning horizon of the ICPR flood policy
(Internationale Kommission zum Schutz des Rheins
(IKSR) 1998), for instance, is the year 2020. The
national governments usually adjust their national
policies to ICPR policies, and implement the agreed
measures. Nevertheless, implementation may take
a long time. For example, the ambitious goals of the
Rhine Action Plan on Floods were not fully realized
as planned (IKSR 2001). The implementation of
ICPR plans is evaluated on a regular basis, but there
are no legal sanctions in case of non-compliance.
The ICPR member states exchange data, cooperate
in research, and exchange interests and points of
view. National governmental actors participate in
the production of information and in the ICPR
working groups, and NGOs participate in the
working groups as observers. Uncertainties are
usually assessed. Legal obligations to make
information accessible have been established at
several levels, and the ICPR disseminates a lot of
information via its website. The ICPR policies
reflect the information that is produced by its
working groups, but it can take a long time before
information on emerging issues enters national and
transboundary policy debates.
The work of the ICPR, as well as the implementation
of its policies, is financed out of public resources of
the riparian countries. As they also make all the
important decisions in the ICPR, decision making
and financing are in one hand, and there is no
reliance on third parties. At the national level,
collective water management issues, such as flood
management, are financed mainly from public
resources, whereas the costs of water supply and
wastewater treatment are to a large extent recovered
from the users.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We set out to develop and test a framework for
assessing the adaptive capacity of transboundary
river basin management regimes. This framework
hypothesizes what the actor networks, laws,
policies, and information management and
financing systems in a transboundary river basin
should look like in order to support adaptive water
management. As mentioned in the introduction,
adaptive management could be useful for dealing
with complex problems, uncertainty, and change.
However, adaptive management may not be
necessary in every situation (van Eeten and Roe
2002). Adaptive management involves high costs,
including the high transaction costs of the necessary
cooperation and integration (Dombrowsky 2007),
and the costs and time needed for gathering the
necessary technical information (Lee 1999). These
high costs may not be justified when dealing with
well-structured issues (cf. Johnson 1999), which are
characterized by agreement about the goals to be
achieved and sufficient technical knowledge.
However, many water management issues are not
well structured, especially in a transboundary
context, and for these issues, adaptive management
provides a useful conceptual model for dealing with
complexity.
Our framework reflects one specific interpretation
of adaptive management that values stakeholder
participation and scientific experimentation
equally, and combines them in one approach. In our
view, the participatory and scientific aspects of
adaptive management cannot be strictly separated,
because even scientific knowledge is not value free,
but influenced by the people involved in producing
it (cf. Douglas 2005). The hypotheses in the
framework have not yet been tested in any strict
sense. We have assessed the “independent
variables,” regime characteristics, but not the
“dependent variables,” operational water management.
This would require the development of criteria and
indicators for adaptive operational management.
However, adaptive management as incorporated in
the framework, as well as many other interpretations
of the concept, leaves room for very different types
of operational management. It does not provide
complete answers to normative questions about who
should adapt, for whom or for what, or how much
it may cost. Adaptive management may result in
solutions that benefit all interests involved, e.g.,
nature protection and economy, but often difficult
choices remain. In theory, the concept offers little
Ecology and Society 13(1): 14
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art14/
help in making these choices. In practice, however,
people using or advocating adaptive management
have their own preferences and may make their own,
implicit and even subconscious choices. Our own
ideal is for adaptive management to promote an
open discussion of both the results and the means
of river basin management, and to help stakeholders
to make their own choices.
Although the framework has not been fully tested,
it has been applied to the Rhine and Orange basins
in order to test its potential for describing and
assessing actual management regimes. This has
resulted in a comprehensive description of the two
regimes. Moreover, their (hypothetical) support for
adaptive management has been assessed, and
regime elements that require further development
have been identified. The assessment of the regimes
has been performed by researchers familiar with the
respective areas, and has been checked by other
researchers, but it remains to some extent
subjective. To reduce this subjectivity, more
objectively measurable indicators, e.g., scaled and/
or quantitative indicators, for the different criteria
should be developed.
The assessment results indicate that the criteria for
adaptive regimes have only been partially met in the
case study basins. An interesting topic for further
research is whether adaptive regimes are feasible.
The situation in the Rhine suggests that many
elements of an adaptive river basin regime can be
developed. The situation in the Orange basin
suggests that not all elements of an adaptive
management regime can develop when the general
institutional and political context is not ready for it.
However, the institutional and political context is
not static, nor are the management regimes
themselves. Regime development in general is a
never-ending, long-term process. The development
of international agreements usually takes 10 or more
years, and sometimes even 100 years (Mostert
2005). Regime developments could be analyzed
using collaboration theory (Gray 1989), focusing on
the role of individuals (e.g., Majone 1989, Saleth
and Dinar 2004) or on group processes (e.g. ,Ostrom
1990). Better insight into the order and time scale
of regime development is needed to support the
transition toward adaptive management regimes
and to identify leverage points. For this purpose,
detailed case studies of regime development over
time, and more theoretical work on regime
development, should be undertaken, each informing
the other (Conca et al. 2006). The influence of
contextual factors that could block or enable the
functioning and formation of adaptive regimes, such
as the distribution of power, costs, and benefits over
the upstream and downstream countries, also needs
additional attention.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art14/responses/
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